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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ENID B. COSGRIFF, HAROLD M. 
ISBELL, RAINER M. DAHL, and THE 
CONTINENTAL BANK AND TRUST 
COMPANY, as Trustee for LYN C. 
ISBELL and PATRICIA C. DAHL, 
Respondents, 
vs. 
GEORGE M. SCHNEITER, JoANN D. 
SCHNEITER, individually as custo-
dian for STEPHEN D. SCHNEITER, 
DANIEL D. SCHNEITER, GEORGE D. 
SCHNEITER, ELIZABETH A. SCHNEITER 
and MICHAEL D. SCHNEITER, 
Appellants. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 15943 
This is an action for declaratory judgment of the 
number of shares held by the shareholders of Lake Hills 
Golf Club, Inc. (Lake Hills), in which the defendants 
(Appellants) , by counterclaim, seek reformation of the 
stock record books. At stake is control of the 
corporation. 
JUDGMENT BELOW 
The district co~rt (Judge G. Hal Taylor, 
presiding) upon a two day non-jury trial entered findings 
of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with 
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Respondents' prayer and dismissed defendants' 
counterclaim. The court below heard the testimony of nine 
witnesses and received and considered approximately 40 
exhibits. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents urge the Court to affirm the judgment 
below in all respects. 
STATEMENT OF FACTsl/ 
The issue presented by this case is how many 
shares of Lake Hills, are owned by the Schneiter family 
{Appellants). The issue arises because while it is 
conceded that the Respondents as a group own 250-l/2l/ 
shares, it was contended, beginning in 1975, by 
Appellants, that they owned 250-1/2 shares as well (see, 
ll Respondents must restate the facts because 
Appel!ants' statement is not a fair reflection of the 
trial record. Appellants assert, for instance, that 
G. M. Schneiter (Schneiter Jr.) did not know the 
source of his original one share (App. 's Br. 3). But 
this is rebutted by the evidence that he was Secretary 
from 1957 (R. 142) until January, 1965 when his wife 
became Secretary in which position she continued until 
this controversy arose (Ex. 2). The Schneiters always 
controlled the stock record book. (R. 142, 145, 175; 
See also Ex. 13) . Appellants assertion of 
representations of equal ownership rests upon the 
unsupported testimony of Schneiter Jr. and is indeed 
refuted, as shown infra. 
ll Schneiter Jr. on cross examination conceded as 
follows: "Q. Do you acknowledge that the Cosgriffs 
own 250-l/2 shares? A. Yes." (R. 143). 
-2-
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e.g., R. 110), "a legal impossibility" as Appellants only 
now concede (App. 's Br. 12). It is "a legal 
impossibility" because the Articles of Incorporation 
authorize only 500 shares (Ex. 2) and Appellants' 
contention would result in a total issue of 501 shares, or 
an over issue of one share. 
As developed infra, this suit was begun by 
Respondents for declaratory judgment, when they learned of 
Appellants claim, to determine the number of shares owned 
by Appellants. (R. 136). Appellants claim to own 250-1/2 
shares ultimately comes down to their contention that 83 
84 (R. 148-150, 151) and their subsequent attempts so to 
obscure the record as to make the impossible appear 
plausible.l/ Respondents suit for declaratory judgment 
thus sought a determination that Appellants owned, as a 
group only 249-1/2. The trial judge found in accordance 
with Respondents' prayer. 
No one contests that in 1956 Walter Cosgriff, 
George Schneiter, Sr. and Ven Savage joined together to 
form Lake Hills. It is equally uncontested that the first 
three issues of stock were: 
ll Appellants in their brief, at 4, now assert that they own 
only 249-1/2 shares. But the evidence is clear that 
Schneiter Jr. claims 250-1/2 shares (R. 143) and there are 
certificates currently standing in the Schneiter family 
name in the amount of 250-1/2. (Ex. 3 and 4; R. 143). 
-3-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Cosgriff Schneiter Savage 
17 16 17 
17 17 16 
50 50 50 
Total TI Total TI Total TI 
There is no evidence, and indeed no contention, 
that any mistake was made in these first three issues, 
despite the fact that thereby Cosgriff owned one more 
share than the other two, and despite the fact that 
Cosgriff characterized these ratios as "one-third."!/ 
This is but one instance of Cosgriff's careless use of 
such imprecise characterizations. 
It is only the fact that Savage agreed to sell 
out to the other two that gives rise to a controversy. 
What is now clear, from Exhibit 13, is that Schneiter, 
Sr., the keeper of the stock record book, (R. 142, 175) 
knew exactly how many shares Savage had to sell and 
reported to Cosgriff that he was dividing these 83 shares 
41-1/2 to Cosgriff, 40-l/2 to himself and 1 to his son. 
No issue would be before the Court had the 
Schneiters' faithfully carried out this expressed intent. 
Instead they caused a certificate (Cert. i 11; Ex. 8) to 
be issued to Schneiter Sr. which read both "41-l/2" and 
"Forty and one-half" and they caused the stub in the stock 
!/ (Ex. 16). Indeed Cosgriff owned 33.6% and the other 
two owned 33.2% each, just a hairs'-breadth away from 
33.33%. 
-4-
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record book (Ex. 3, stub ll) to read "4~-l/2,"~/. There 
was also issued in 1957 one share to Schneiter Jr., which 
is clearly a transfer share from Savage's stock (Ex. 3, 
stub 12). The conflicting numbers on Certificate #ll and 
the stock record book (Ex. 3) later gave rise to the claim 
that 83 84, and thus to Appellants' claim to own 250-l/2 
shares. It is equally clear from Exhibits 16 and 18 that 
Cosgriff paid exactly one-half and Schneiter exactly 
one-half of the total price for Savage's shares. 
Following this buy-out, the corporation issued an 
additional 125 shares to each of Cosgriff and Schneiter, 
Sr. There is no claim that any mistake was made in this 
issue and there certainly is no evidence of mistake. So 
matters rested for 18 years during which time both 
Schneiter Sr. and Cosgriff died and their shares were 
distributed to their heirs. 
In the years that followed, the Cosgriff family 
continued to furnish financial assistance to the 
corporation and the Schneiters continued in the day to day 
management. (R. 117). After both Walter Cosgriff and 
George Schneiter, Sr. died, Mrs. Cosgriff represented the 
~/ The figure 4~-l/2 is correct; the zero had a line 
drawn through it. (R. 113, 127, 135-136; Ex 5). 
Schneiter, Jr.'s testimony, if it can be believed, was 
that he found the stock to so read after his father's 
death. But he also conceded the record book was 
exclusively in the Schneiters' control. (R. 142, 145). 
-5-
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Cosgriff interests on the Board of Directors (R. 109) and 
George Schneiter, Jr. took over the daily management 
responsibilities. Mrs. Cosgriff always understood that 
she and her family had control (R. 109) and the Cosgriffs 
had the final word on such things as Schneiter Jr.'s 
salary (R. 117, 201), despite the fact that Mrs. Cosgriff 
might have been technically out voted on the Board by 
Schneiter, Jr. and his wife. (R. 109, 201). 
It was only in the Spring of 1975 that the 
Cosgriff family learned that Schneiter, Jr. contended that 
he and his family owned 250-1/2 shares of the corporation, 
a contention that, of course, requires the creation of an 
additional share out of thin air. Years earlier 
Mrs. Cosgriff had installed her brother, Robert Barr, on 
the Board and had transferred one of her shares to him so 
he would qualify as a shareholder-director. (R. 111). In 
1975 Mrs. Cosgriff determined to turn over the directorial 
oversight to her sons-in-law, Harold Isbell and Rainer 
Dahl. (R. 130). She, therefore, in a meeting with 
Schneiter, Jr., Isbell and Barr asked Schneiter, Jr. to 
transfer the one share standing in Barr's name back to 
her. In response Schneiter, Jr. turned to Barr, offered 
to buy the share, and asked Barr to name his price. Barr, 
of course, refused saying the share represented control. 
Schneiter, Jr. thereupon insisted it did not. (R. 111, 
121-122, 131). A few weeks later Schneiter, Jr. in a 
-6-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
conversation with Isbell insisted he owned 250-1/2 shares 
(R. 133) and indeed the Schneiters had certificates which 
on their face added up to 250-1/2. (R. 143). 
These exchanges precipitated an examination (R. 
112), for the first time, of the stock record book by the 
Cosgriff family and hence their discovery of the 
conflicting numbers in the stock records (R. 127, 131). 
The exchanges also prompted the Schneiters' attempt to 
improve their position by (a) obliterating the critical 
figure in the stock record book~/ and (b) unilaterally 
increasing the capital stock account by $100 to 
$50,100,2/ an increase which would reflect the issuance 
of 501 shares of stock. 
In contradiction to this overwhelming evidence 
Appellants rely upon (a) some correspondence and 
conversation in which Mr. Cosgriff loosely and imprecisely 
characterized his relationship with Savage and Schneiter, 
(b) a letter of Schneiter, Sr.'s (Ex. 13), and (c) the 
testimony of Schneiter, Jr., all of which has been related 
in Appellants' Brief. 
~/ Schneiter admitted blotting the figure after the 
Cosgriffs examined the stock record book. 
(R. 151-152). 
21 Exhibits 11 and 12, being balance sheets of the 
corporation for August and September 1975. This 
change was made at Schneiter, Jr.'s instance. (R. 
159-161). 
-7-
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ARGUMENT 
I. APPELLANTS' BURDEN WAS TO SHOW MUTUAL MISTAKE 
BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE. 
This case is a graphic illustration of the wisdom 
of a very basic and profound standard of this Court; that 
is, that mutual mistake sufficient to warrant reformation 
must be established by clear and convincing evidence. 
Evidence necessary to substantiate the 
mutual mistake of fact must be clear, 
definite and convincing, and the party 
seeking reformation should not be guilty of 
negligence in the execution of the contract . 
• . or laches in making timely application 
for the reformation. This principle has 
consistently been applied in equity 
throughout its reformation of instrument 
cases. 
Naisbitt v. Hodges, 6 Utah 2d 116, 307 P.2d 
620, 623 (1957). 
See also Peterson v. Eldredge, 122 Utah 96, 246 P.2d 886 
(1952). 
This rule is especially salutory in a case where 
one party seeks to reform an agreement made over 20 years 
ago when the only people who could testify as to intent 
are both long dead, and where the written record is~itself 
scanty. It should also be pointed out that the 
Schneiters' own conduct created whatever confusion now 
exists, and that they were content to rest on that 
confusion for nearly 20 years. 
To have awarded reformation the district court 
would have had to ignore this rule of law. Indeed the 
court below would have had to rely on evidence which, 
-8-
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taken as a whole, would not warrant reformation under any 
standard of proof. 
II. APPELLANTS HAVE NOT ESTABLISHED MUTUAL 
MISTAKE BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE. 
Appellants' nowhere in their brief cite a single 
line of evidence that Walter Cosgriff intended to acquire 
less than one-half of Savage's stock. Equally, there is 
no evidence that Walter Cosgriff ever intended to permit 
Schneiter, Jr. to buy a single share of treasury stock. 
(See footnote 4 on p. 9 of their brief where Appellants 
make this suggestion}. 
Respondents suggest a review of the exhibits 
(including those not received, but now relied upon by 
Appellants} in chronological order for the period before 
and up to the date of the Savage buy-out. They are 
Exhibits 14, 15, 16, l3 and 19. 
Exhibi~ 14 is Cosgriff's and Schneiter's joint 
letter to Savage proposing to Savage that he either 
acquire Cosgriff's and Schneiter's stock or sell his 
stock. In that letter Cosgriff and Schneiter proposed to 
Savage that "you then agree to sell us your stock .. 
. costing $100.00 a share or a total price of approximately 
$8,333.33 at a $15,000.00 profit, or a purchase price of 
$23,333.33". 
Also, on that same date, Cosgriff prepared 
Exhibit 15 addressed to Savage advising him that the 
corporation needed $25,000 additional capital and that the 
-9-
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three shareholders should have a right to purchase "our 
pro rata share" and that "each of us would have to put up 
$8,333.33". The letter further provided for Savage to 
assign his interest to Cosgriff if Savage was not willing 
to advance the additional funds required. Schneiter on 
Exhibit 15 accepted this assignment. 
A few days later, by Exhibit 16, Cosgriff wrote 
Schneiter to advise Schneiter that he had paid Savage 
$23,300 "covering the purchase apparently of 83 shares 
. representing his approximate one-third interest." 
Cosgriff went on to write "you would want and would expect 
to put up half of this money so that we would each own a 
50% interest." 
The most fav~rable inference for Appellants' from 
this correspondence is that (a) Cosgriff and Schneiter 
believed when Exhibits 14 and 15 were written that Savage 
owned approximately 83-1/3 shares, (b) a few days later 
when Cosgriff wrote Exhibit 16 he had learned that Savage 
owned 83 shares which represented an approximate one-third 
interest and (c) Cosgriff offered Schneiter the 
opportunity to acquire half of Savage's stock apparently 
thinking this would result in an equal division of the 
stock. 
Unfortunately for Appellants the more plausible 
inference that could be drawn from the evidence was that 
-10-
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Cosgriff never cared about exact equivalents, but was only 
thinking in approximations. This latter inference is 
supported by the way in which the first three issues of 
stock were handled. Thus, in the first issue Schneiter 
got 16 shares while the other two got 17 each. In the 
second issue Savage got 16 and the other two 17 each. 
Thus, Cosgriff owned one more share than the other two. 
In the third issue of stock, no attempt was made to 
rectify the inequality, the parties obviously not being 
concerned about such an exactitude as is only now asserted 
by Appellants. 
Nearly a month later, on October 10, 1957, 
Schneiter wrote to Cosgriff, Exhibit 13. In that letter, 
the person who kept the stock record book wrote that 
Savage's shares were being divided 41-1/2 to Cosgriff, and 
41-1/2 to Schneiter, Sr. out of which Schneiter, Sr. was 
assigning one share to Schneiter, Jr., "thinking that you 
[Cosgriff] would probably prefer to maintain fifty percent 
interest." Exhibit 19 demonstrates that Schneiter paid 
exactly one half of the purchase price for Savage's stock. 
Thus, the only intent clearly expressed by both 
parties to the transaction was that Savage's 83 shares be 
paid for and divided equally. There is no hint that these 
good friends (R. 163) were concerned about maintaining 
equality of shareholdings with exactitude. (Indeed 
-11-
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Schneiter, Sr. by his acceptance of the terms of Exhibit 
15 was prepared to see Cosgriff acquire a very substantial 
majority position.) The use of such terms as "one third," 
and "50%" were merely used as approximations. These 
documents do not amount to clear, definite and convincing 
evidence that the result sought was exact equality of 
ownership. The other evidence cited by Appellants does 
not add anything to their contention. Walter Cosgriff's 
offhand statements of equal ownership are again merely 
approximations. Very few of us would differentiate 
between 50.0% and 50.1% when describing, in casual 
conversation, a business relationship with a good friend. 
Indeed some of this evidence cited by Appellants is quite 
incredible and could not have been believed by the trier 
of facts.!!./ 
In summary the evidence before the trial court is 
susceptible of two inferences: first, that Cosgriff was 
speaking loosely and did not intend anything more than an 
approximation of one-third or one-half; and second, that 
Cosgriff was in error in assuming that the equal division 
of Savage's stock would result in exact equality between 
him and the Schneiters. However, either inference could 
!!_! For instance Schneiter, Jr. testified that Walter 
Cosgriff in the same conversation in which he 
mentioned equality also promised to give up his 
valuable investment free of charge to the Schneiters. 
(R. 167, 169, 197). 
-12-
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be drawn by the trier of facts. There is no compelling 
reason to draw the inference urged by Appellants. Because 
of this, Appellants have failed to establish their 
counterclaim by clear and convincing evidence. The 
judgment below should be affirmed because the evidence 
does not clearly preponderate against the finding of the 
trial judge. Provo City v. Lambert, 574 P.2d 727, 730 
(Utah, 1978). 
III. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF SUCH MUTUAL MISTAKE 
AS WOULD WARRANT REFORMATION. 
Let us assume arguendo that the only permissible 
inference from the evidence is that Cosgriff believed an 
equal division of Savage's stock would result in exact 
equality between himself and the Schneiters. Even in this 
instance Appellants would not be entitled to reformation. 
Reformation is typically appropriate where the 
parties agreed orally to a term, but the written contract 
either omits the term or contains a contradictory term. 
That is to say, there must be a pre-existing agreement not 
reflected in the writing. 
Professor Corbin in his treatise on contracts 
states the general requirement for reformation, the 
existence of a pre-existing agreement, as follows: 
Whatever may be the form of the transaction 
... and whatever may be the explanatory 
theory as to when and how the contract 
became binding, a court will not decree 
reformation unless it has convincing 
evidence that the parties expressed 
agreement and an intention to be bound in 
-13-
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accordance with the terms that the court is 
asked to establish and enforce. 
3 Corbin on Contracts, § 614 at 725 (1960). 
In State v. Ashton, 4 Ariz. App. 599, 422 P.2d 
727, 730 (1967), this same rule is stated as follows: 
To entitle one to reformation, it is 
essential to show that a definite intention 
on which the minds of the parties had met 
pre-existed the written instrument and that 
the mistake occurred in its execution. 
Greenfield v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 
75 Ohio App. 122, 61 N .E. 2d 226 ( 1944) . If 
the minds of the parties had not met in a 
prior agreement, there is nothing to be 
corrected. 76 C.J.S. Reformation of 
Instruments 18. 
The Utah rule is no different. 
The right to reform is given, at least in 
part, so as to make the written instrument 
express the bargain the parties previously 
orally agreed upon. When a writing is 
reformed the result is that an oral 
agreement is by court decre2 made legally 
effective although at variance with the 
writings which the parties had agreed upon 
as a memorial of their bargain. 
Bench v. Pace, 538 P.2d 180, 182 (Utah 1975). 
See also Naisbitt v. Hodges, 6 Utah 2d 116, 307 P.2d 620, 
623 (1957). 
In the case at bar the precondition to 
reformation has not been shown. There is no evidence of 
any prior agreement. The only evidence of the intent of 
either party to the transaction is that the Schneiters 
were to get 41-1/2 shares of Savage's 83 shares. (Ex. 
13). T!'lere is, therefore, no basis at all for reformation. 
That the result of this transaction was not to 
effect an exactly equal division of shares does not 
-14-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
advance Appellants' position, even if it could be found 
that the parties intended that result. Percival v. 
Cooper, 525 P.2d 41 (Utah 1974). In Percival the parties 
each believed they were dealing with a half-acre parcel. 
The deed given, however, described the lot as a rectangle 
measuring 114.5 feet by 165 feet, or slightly less than a 
half-acre. Apparently in Percival, as here, simple 
mathematics were not applied. This Court, in Percival, 
refused to reform the deed even though there was clear and 
convincing evidence the parties believed they were 
conveying a half-acre. Similarly here there should be no 
reformation. 
Appellants' argument is, in essence, that the 
agreement reached by Schneiter and Cosgriff was based on a 
mistaken belief of the pre-exist1ng facts, the number of 
shares owned by each. In effect Appellants urge that a 
different agreement might have been reached had the 
parties been more accurately informed. But the court 
cannot now reform the documentation of their agreement, 
even if the agreement was entered into based upon a 
mistake of fact, since the mistake occurred prior to their 
agreement. Professor Corbin in his treatise on contracts 
elaborates on the requirement that the mistake justifying 
reformation must occur after the agreement is reached. 
If two parties are caused to enter into a 
contract by reason of their common ignorance 
or common mistake as to some fact, but for 
which they would have not agreed, this may 
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be ground for rescission, but it is not 
ground for reformation. Proof of such a 
mistake as this does not show that the 
parties have ever expressed assent, orally 
or otherwise, to any contract other than the 
one written. That writing truly expresses 
the only terms on which they have agreed. 
It may be subject to rescission for mistake; 
but there is no other agreement in 
accordance with which it can be "reformed." 
3 Corbin on Contracts, § 614 at 728 (1960). 
Willison states a similar rule: 
Still more clearly, if, because of mistake 
as to an antecedent or existing situation, 
the parties make a written instrument which 
they might not have made, except for the 
mistake, the court cannot reform the writing 
into one which it thinks they would have 
made, but in fact never agreed to make. 
13 Williston on Contracts, § 1549 at 134 
(1970). 
See also Russell v. Shell Petroleum Corporation, 
66 F.2d 864, 867 (lOth Cir. 1933), where the Court said: 
To justify reformation on the ground of 
mistake, the mistake must have been made in 
the drawing of the instrument and not in the 
making of the contract which it evidences. 
Robinson v. Korns, 250 Mo. 665, 157 S.W. 
790; Curtis v. Albee, 167, N.Y. 360, 60 N.E. 
660. A mistake as to the existing 
situation, which leads either one or both of 
the parties to enter into a contract which 
they would not have entered into had they 
been apprised of the actual facts, will not 
justify reformation. It is not what the 
parties would have intended if they had 
known better, but what did they intend at 
the time, informed as they were. 
Mutual mistake justifying reformation "may be 
defined as error in reducing the concurring intentions of 
the parties to writing" Naisbitt v. Hodges, supra at 623. 
It is not sufficient to prove only a misapprehension of 
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the facts. Giving Appellants the benefit of all 
inferences, all that the trier of facts in the instant 
case could possibly infer from the evidence is that the 
parties intended the Schneiters to receive 41-1/2 shares 
of Savage's stock, and Cosgriff to receive 41-1/2 shares 
in the expectation that thereby each family would own 
one-half of the stock of the corporation. The trier of 
fact could have inferred, and did, that the parties were 
speaking without regard to exactitude but were satisfied 
with approximate equality. Such a record does not reflect 
the clear, definite and convincing evidence required. 
Moreover, it is, as a matter of law, giving Appellants the 
benefit of all inferences, not such evidence as shows 
mutual mistakes justifying reformation. 
The trial court correctly ruled that Appellants' 
counterclaim for reformation be dismissed with prejudice. 
This Court should affirm. 
IV. THE EXCLUDED EVIDENCE WAS CORRECTLY EXCLUDED. 
During the trial the court excluded certain 
documents, of which Appellants now complain. (Ex. 15, 
App. 's Br. 6; Ex. 20, App. 's Br. 11). Those documents do 
not tend to establish any of the elements of a cause of 
action for reformation. Individually, or in the 
aggregate, they either tend to show a careless use of 
language, the propensity of us all to speak in 
approximations, or a belief that a different result would 
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be or was achieved by dividing Savage's stock 41-1/2 
shares to each family. Their exclusion was thus not 
prej ud ic ial. 
V. APPELLANTS' ESTOPPEL ARGUMENT MERELY RAISES 
ISSUES OF CREDIBILITY WHICH WERE RESOLVED 
AGAINST APPELLANTS BELOW. 
In Point II of their brief, Appellants assert that the 
trial court should have found an estoppel that barred 
plaintiffs' claim. This argument merely raises questions 
of credibility, especially the credibility of Schneiter, 
Jr. For instance on pp. 16 and 17 of their brief, 
Appellants cite as record support for their assertions the 
testimony of Schneiter, Jr. Obviously, the trial court 
chose not to believe this testimony. Some of it is 
inherently incredible, such as the testimony by Schneiter 
that Mr. Cosgriff intended to give his valuable investment 
to the Schneiters. (R. 167, 169, 197). As Appellants 
concede much of it is disputed by the testimony of other 
witnesses. (App. 's Br. at 17, fn. 8. See also R. 238-240 
for additional rebuttal testimony.) The essential element 
of Appellants' estoppel argument is that the Respondents 
long acquiesced in Appellants' claim to equal ownership. 
However, there is ample testimony that only in 1975 did 
the Cosgriff interests learn that the Schneiters asserted 
equal ownership, knowledge which quickly precipitated this 
suit. (R. 111-112, 121-122, 127, 130-131) . 
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Not only is the testimony of Schneiter disputed 
but Schneiter was shown to be unreliable. He obliterated 
the stock record book so as to cast confusion about the 
number of shares owned by him. He improperly changed the 
financial records so as to reflect an additional share of 
stock in his name. 
It is, therefore, not surprising or inappropriate 
that the trier of the facts, who had a chance to observe 
Schneiter, Jr. on the stand, chose to disbelieve him. 
Issues of credibility are appropriately lodged with the 
trier of facts, not an appellate court. Filmore City v. 
Reeve, 571 P.2d 1316, 1318 {Utah 1977). 
Schneiter's testimony as to reliance is equally 
suspect. He conceded that his involvement with Lake Hills 
afforded him, in addition to the cash salary and 50 lots 
concededly paid him, numerous opportunities for profit, 
such as operation of a golfing-goods store on the 
premises, a driving range concession on the premises, and 
golf cart rental on the premises {R. 201-206) .2/ He 
also had the opportunity to oversee his family investment 
and thereby make himself a rich man through the 
appreciation of his stock. 
~/ He also testified he was actively pursuing other 
business enterprises in Utah during the period {R. 
199) . 
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Appellants' evidence of estoppel is not only 
disputed by other more credible witnesses but it also is 
internally inconsistent in that there existed ample 
reasons for him to devote his time to Lake Hills even as a 
minority shareholder. Appellants have failed to carry 
this defense by a prepondurance of the evidence. 
Accordingly, the Court should affirm the judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
As stated earlier, this appeal presents this Court 
with an example of the salutory purposes of the 
requirement for clear, definite and convincing evidence in 
a suit for reformation. Appellants seek to reform a 
contract over 20 years old when all the principal actors 
are long dead, relying solely upon ambiguous evidence 
susceptible to two rational inferences. It is precisely 
this type of evidence that the rule is designed to 
defeat. Accordingly, the Court should affirm the judgment 
below in all respect. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
Warren Patten 
800 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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